Hearing: Kazakhstan`s Bid to Chair OSCE in 2009

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (HELSINKI COMMISSION) HOLDS HEARING: "KAZAKHSTAN'S BID TO CHAIR THE OSCE: A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR A FOOLHARDY AMBITION?"

OCTOBER 16, 2007

                               COMMISSIONERS:

               REP. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, D-FLA., CHAIRMAN

               REP. LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER, D-N.Y.

               REP. MIKE MCINTYRE, D-N.C.

               REP. HILDA L. SOLIS, D-CALIF.

               REP. G.K. BUTTERFIELD, D-N.C.

               REP. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, R-N.J.

               REP. ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, R-ALA.

               REP. MIKE PENCE, R-IND.

               REP. JOSEPH R. PITTS, R-PENN.

               SEN. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, D-MD., CO-CHAIRMAN

               SEN. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, D-CONN.

               SEN. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, D-WIS.

               SEN. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, D-N.Y.

               SEN. JOHN F. KERRY, D-MASS.

               SEN. SAM BROWNBACK, R-KAN.

               SEN. GORDON H. SMITH, R-ORE.

               SEN. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, R-GA.

               SEN. RICHARD BURR, R-N.C.

                               WITNESSES/PANELISTS:

               ERLAN A. IDRISSOV,

               KAZAKHASTAN'S AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.

               DAVID MERKEL,

               FORMER DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL ASIA,

               NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

               ROBERT HERMAN,

               DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS,

               FREEDOM HOUSE

               YEVGENIY ZHOVTIS,

               DIRECTOR,

               KAZAKHSTAN INTERNATIONAL BUREAU FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

               AND RULE OF LAW

The hearing was held at 10:00 a.m. in Room 210 of the Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Congressman Alcee L. Hastings and Senator Benjamin L. Cardin moderating.

HASTINGS: 

Ladies and gentlemen, the hearing will come to order. I like to start on time.  My understanding is several of the commissioners will come along.  As a matter of fact, as I speak, the ranking commissioner is coming in the room. But we'll begin with our opening statements and then go to our witnesses.  I want to welcome all of you to this commission hearing, and obviously there is great interest in the subject of our inquiry with reference to Kazakh's bid to chair the OSCE in 2009, and I consider it to be especially timely and important.

I'm not at all surprised at the level of interest that has been demonstrated not just by the presence of those of you here but others that have continuously spoken about this matter. Much is at stake here.  Indeed, one of the goals today is to illuminate just how much is at stake for Washington, for Kazakhstan, for Central Asia, for Russia, and for the OSCE security organization known for its promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

The former Soviet republics joined the OSCE in 1992, thereby agreeing to implement all of its commitments on democratization and human rights. Kazakhstan, like most of the ex-Soviet states, has found this a difficult transition.  Consequently, Kazakhstan's candidacy has been controversial, ever since it was put forward in the year 2003. For Washington and for many other OSCE capitals, Kazakhstan's bid crystallizes the competing imperatives of seeking to promote democracy while maintaining and strengthening ties with an energy-rich moderate Islamic state eager to build good relations with the Western world. Washington has consistently said to Kazakhstan that the U.S. supports Astana's ambition to chair the OSCE but insists on demonstrable progress on human rights.

The question was actually supposed to be settled at last year's OSCE ministerial.  However, the participating states could not reach agreement about supporting Kazakhstan's bid. It's no secret that the American administration, citing the record of flawed elections, continuing human rights problems and the concentration of power in the executive branch, was among those OSCE capitals that did not back Astana's candidacy.

For that reason, the matter was essentially postponed last year in the hope that circumstances would change in the interim so as to make the decision in favor of Kazakhstan easier to make this year. The picture in the past year is a decidedly mixed one.  President Nazarbayev received parliamentary sanction to remain in office for life, if he so chooses.  Parliamentary elections in August, according to some accounts, did not meet OSCE standards and produced a one-party legislature. So while no official statement has been issued by the administration, and none may be forthcoming before November, the indications are that the U.S. remains reluctant to endorse Kazakhstan. Apparently, even some countries that formally supported Astana's candidacy are rethinking their position.  That's where we stand today, with the November ministerial right around the corner.

Some of you may have noted the absence from our panel of distinguished witnesses of any representatives of the United States government.  Let me assure you that it is not an oversight.

I and other members of the commission and other members who are not members of the commission have been in discussions with high-level State Department officials about this matter for some time and felt that considering the delicate diplomacy involved, it would not be entirely helpful to ask the department to air its views in public here today.

But that does not mean we cannot examine this complex issue with other non-U.S. government experts. Hearing from proponents and opponents of Kazakhstan's candidacy will help all of us reach a conclusion on that country's suitability to head the OSCE and the ramifications for the United States of a "yes" or "no" vote.  To that end, we've very carefully selected our witnesses. And before identifying them and asking them to go forward, I'd like to recognize my good friend, the ranking member from New Jersey, Chris Smith, for any opening comments he may make.

C. SMITH: 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I want to thank you for convening this very important hearing.  I believe that and have believed since 2003 that the Kazakhstan's candidacy to chair the OSCE deserves the closest attention from policy makers. And as far as I know, this hearing is the first open discussion of this issue.  It comes at just the right moment, given the impending OSCE ministerial in Madrid.  So again, I want to thank you for convening this very timely and very important hearing.

Let me say at the outset that I would, in principle, be happy to welcome Kazakhstan's candidacy.

It would, indeed, be healthy for the OSCE if Kazakhstan or any of the former Soviet republics were ready to chair the organization.  It would signal important growth and maturity for the country in question as well as for the OSCE. But I fundamentally disagree with the official Kazakh perspective that chairing the OSCE is a right and not a privilege. On the contrary, the OSCE chair-in-office, for reasons symbolic and substantive, is too important to be merely a rotating position which any participating state can hold.

I believe that the OSCE chairman must represent a nation that is in compliance with OSCE commitments.  We cannot be content to have as the chair simply the most democratic of the OSCE's most repressive states. Since 2003, the United States government has been conveying memoranda to the Kazakh authorities detailing what reforms they must implement to gain Washington's backing. I have referred to these documents myself in conversations with Kazakh legislators in meetings at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly as well as with Kazakh officials visiting Washington, D.C.

Unfortunately, Kazakhstan has not yet made the necessary reforms.  The country's constitution calls for a balance of power, but President Nazarbayev rules his country autocratically. The legislature and the courts provide no genuine checks and balances.  Electronic media, though formally privatized, remain under strict state control. There are still some opposition parties that have not been registered, and Kazakh authorities carefully limit the freedom of assembly. Though many religions coexist in Kazakhstan, I'm deeply disturbed that Kazakh law insists on registering communities of faith.  And I'm deeply concerned about the recent raid on Grace Presbyterian Church in Karaganda and problems faced by the Hare Krishna.

Mr. Chairman, all of this was the situation even before the events of this year, when parliament gave Mr. Nazarbayev the right to be president for life, a very disturbing trend in many parts of the world, before yet another election that the OSCE could not certify as free and fair, and before the emergence of a one-party parliament that surely would do President Nazarbayev's bidding in all matters. Even before this year, I was unable in good conscience to support Kazakhstan's candidacy for '09.  After the events of '07, I certainly cannot.  It is my understanding that U.S. diplomats have been urging the Kazakhs to think about 2011 instead. Putting off a Kazakh chairmanship two more years does not make it automatic.  I will not be able to support a Kazakh bid any year until the country makes the substantive reforms.  And that's what we're calling for.

But if and when they make these reforms, Mr. Chairman, I'm sure both you and I will be the first to applaud and congratulate and encourage the Kazakhstan government on its success and welcome its holding of this important position.

Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.  It's timely and hopefully sends a clear, non-ambiguous message about our concerns on this OSCE commission.

HASTINGS:

 Thank you very much, Commissioner Smith.

I turn now to the witnesses, and our first witness will be the ambassador from the country of Kazakhstan, Erlan Idrissov. Ambassador Idrissov comes to this post after a long and distinguished career, most recently as his country's ambassador to the United Kingdom, and previously he served as Kazakhstan's foreign minister. It's hard for me to imagine anyone who could better make the case for his country's candidacy than the ambassador, and I'm deeply indebted to him for agreeing to come.

We also have with us a former United States government official, Mr. David Merkel, who is a former deputy assistant secretary of commerce, and was also a staff person on Capitol Hill, so there's some opportunity for you young staffers yet. So he is intimately acquainted with the mechanics and drama of a congressional hearing, and most recently was the director for Central Asia at the National Security Council, where he was directly involved in deliberations about the issue under discussion.

Additionally, we have with us some persons from the NGO community.  What we did was on September 21st a coalition of U.S.-based organizations issued a public statement urging Washington not to support Kazakhstan for OSCE chair. We asked those participating organizations to select someone to represent them, and they chose Dr. Robert Herman, who is here with us today, who is the director of programs at Freedom House.

And additionally, we have with us Mr. Zhovtis, the director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law.  Mr. Zhovtis has been one of the leading human rights activists in Kazakhstan for many years. And we are fortunate that he happens to be in Washington this week and that he could participate in this hearing.

There were many other witnesses we considered inviting, but we decided to keep the number small to allow more time for questions.  Possibly we may return to this issue in another hearing at which other points of view could be expressed. Now, without objection, all of your statements and testimony will be entered into the record, and I'd ask you, as much as possible, to summarize your remarks and keep them as brief as possible so that we can put our questions and give you time to be able to answer them. I'd like to begin, if we may, with Ambassador Idrissov. Ambassador, you have the floor.

IDRISSOV: 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  Let me indulge that -- express our full appreciation to you, to Co-Chairman Senator Cardin, to the commissioners, to the members of the Helsinki Commission, for convening this hearing today. Let me take this opportunity also to greet and welcome, first of all, my countrymen.  I can recognize Mr. Zhovtis here.  I can recognize Madam Fokina (ph) here.

And of course, my appreciation to Dr. Merkel and Dr. Herman for being with us today to testimony on this important issue.

I have provided a very detailed written testimony for your attention and consideration, and I believe that I have explained in very detail our vision for ongoing political and economic growth in Kazakhstan and also our vision for our goals to chair the OSCE. Therefore, I wouldn't dwell on that.  I hope that everyone had the opportunity to familiarize with these points I raised in the testimony, and I will be absolutely happy to address them at the Q&A session. Let me focus on a number of points which already have been touched upon.  I, of course, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your thoughtful remarks at the opening of this session, and I would like to thank Commissioner Smith for his comments and ideas.

I would like to focus briefly on a number of common misconceptions which exist in the West about my country.  We are frequently described as a dictatorship led by an autocratic ruler, and we very often are being criticized for being slow to promote democratic reforms in Kazakhstan.

In fact, Kazakhstan is a country which is only 15 years old and which, in that short period of time, has achieved remarkable progress in transforming itself from a former Soviet republic into a new and increasingly successful Western-style democracy. We sometimes do not understand what slow means.  If you take the U.K.'s example -- I served there for five years as ambassador, and I know it took them more than 700 years to arrive at the status of their society as they are today, with often violent interludes. In Kazakhstan, we have achieved a remarkable degree, extraordinary degree, of political freedom in just 15 years, without any violence at all. The reality which Western observers often forget is that democracy is not only about laws and institutions, it is fundamentally about custom, habit and culture, supported by property rights, backed by the rule of law, without which there can be no (inaudible) democracy at all.

One cannot expect to create a parliament one day and expect a democratic debate to occur in it the next day.        Opposition and free media are responsible, as they are, in the society -- cannot be established by -- at the stroke of a pen. Establishing and nurturing an independent judiciary is an even greater challenge, as is tackling corruption at all levels. A common misconception in the West is that in Kazakhstan we are forcefully dragged down the path to democracy against our own will.  This is not true. We have chosen to become a democracy because we believe it is the best way to run our society, ensure the prosperity of our people and guarantee the long-term security and prosperity of our state.

We have our own plans for political and economic growth.  We have an almost impeccable record of economic growth. The new plans for political reform have been meticulously developed and debated widely in our society and envisage an enhanced role of the parliament; nurturing of political parties and civil society institutions; building genuinely free media; efficient, fair and transparent judiciary system; and institutions supporting the rule of law.            We want to develop and enhance the tradition and culture of good and efficient local governance.  These are the plans.

The combination of that came in May 19 of this year, in 2007, when we have announced major constitutional reforms.  I have provided full details for the constitutional reforms in our papers, and there are additional papers for the distribution outside this room. But I will say that the gist of the constitutional amendments is the gradual ceding of powers by the president to the legislature and a thoughtful move toward a parliamentary majority system. This is what we announced, and this is what we'll do and absolutely confident that we will succeed in doing this, as we have been successful in promoting and implementing economic reforms.

As far as the OSCE bid is concerned, we made very clear that we believe that we can bring value and we can bring new substance to the organization.  We value our cooperation with the OSCE because we believe it is one of the strong proponents and facilitators of our ongoing political growth.

We have a clear-cut vision for our chairmanship in the OSCE if we have the privilege to be elected as the chairman of OSCE.  We will focus on all three dimensions of the organization, because we believe they are interdependent. And we will work hard with our partners to promote further the values, the integrity and the standards of the OSCE throughout bigger region which is going beyond the traditional territory of OSCE.

In fact, everyone recognizes that the focus of attention is more toward our part of the world, and Central Asia is becoming a matter of importance in terms of coming years. Therefore, we believe that the United States, which is a strong proponent and promoter of democracy throughout the world, and freedom, should understand the gist of our bid, and we believe that it is only in the interest of the United States to be a champion in supporting Kazakhstan's bid to chair the organization. We are confident that we'll do our job in full compliance and with full understanding of the values of the organization.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude my brief remarks by telling you an old saying among Kazakhs.  There is a Kazakh saying which says that a road of 10,000 steps is being traveled by making the first step.     So we believe that a road to democracy is also a long road, an important road.  The United States is making its 9,757th step on this road, and Kazakhstan is making its 16th step.

But please be assured that we are on the same road.  What we are trying to do is what your forefathers were trying to do more than 200 years ago. Actually, we, sitting in front of you, are a replica of your forefathers as they were trying to bring new values to the new society more than 200 years ago.

But there is no traffic police on this road.  Therefore, one should be self-disciplined, and wise and thoughtful in moving ahead along this path. We should definitely apply by ourselves and with the support of and vision of our partners wise and thoughtful speed limits, not to over-haste and bring damage to the delicate fabric of promotion new values in our society. We believe that we have remained faithful and loyal along this path, along these 15 years of our independence.  We have shown our support to the values we share with the United States.

On any imaginable tracks, whether it is global security, nonproliferation, a war on terrorism, economic reforms or democratization, we believe that we have every right to count on the reciprocity on the part of the United States. I thank you very much.

HASTINGS: 

Thank you very much, Ambassador, for your comments and for summarizing them. And for purposes of the audience participants, I believe the ambassador's full statement's available for your perusal as you see fit. I'd like to go now to Mr. David Merkel. I've already indicated some portions of your curriculum vitae, but you have the floor.

MERKEL: 

Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman Hastings, Congressman Smith.  I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today. As you said, having worked on Capitol Hill, the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Policy Committee, I appreciate the importance of the commission, and I think it's really important that you're taking on this issue today.

I'd like to start my testimony with the indisputable fact that Kazakhstan has not held an election that the OSCE has found to meet international standards. Despite this, I believe that it is in the interest of Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the United States and the OSCE for them to be named as chairman-in-office in Madrid.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, I would talk to friends of mine in Central Asia and express to them the interest and importance the United States places on the region. They would politely listen, often over tea, and then would inform me that the United States is fickle and far away and that our interest would wane.  And until September 11th, they were largely correct. But on that day, we learned that instability anywhere has a direct national security impact on the United States.  This is not to say that there were not those who paid attention, including myself and members of this commission's staff, to Central Asia. Energy, security, liberty form the crux of our interest in Central Asia and Kazakhstan today.

How can we best pursue our interests given that some of the neighbors who are very actively engaged -- Russia, China, Iran -- do not see democracy promotion as anything more than a destabilizing effort and have no interest in seeing Central Asian energy reach global markets other than through a reliance on them for its transportation?

When I was at the National Security Council, the president spelled out our interests in his national security strategy of 2006.  It said Central Asia is an enduring priority for our foreign policy.  The five countries of Central Asia are distinct from one another, and our relations with each, while important, will differ. In the region as a whole, the elements of our larger strategy meet, and we must pursue these elements simultaneously:  Promoting effective democracies and the expansion of free market reform, diversifying global sources of energy, and enhancing security and winning the war on terrorism.

While the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's ODIHR office report on the last parliamentary election concluded that it did not meet international standards, it did indicate that improvements were made over previous elections, including citing important improvements with the central election commission. I've observed many elections in Eurasia, including with ODIHR, and I find that they provide a valuable service to member countries.  While I would not quibble with the conclusions reached by the OSCE, I do think it important to make a couple of points to you today.

Kazakhstan is a country still in transition.  If the chairman-in-office post needs to go to a country with an established tradition as a functioning democracy, this is never previously been spelled out and will have the undesired effect of creating two classes of OSCE members. Kazakhstan is a country that respects diversity, both religious and ethnic, and where the youth, by and large, are excited about their future in Kazakhstan.  This stands in contrast to many of the countries in Central Asia.

Also, despite the fact that the last presidential and parliamentary elections were not judged by the OSCE to meet international standards, it is without question that that the election results reflect the will of the people and that President Nazarbayev and Prime Minister Masimov have a clear and unequivocal mandate as their country's legitimate leaders.

One of the difficulties in Central Asia, in my view, is the lack of appropriate regional architecture.  For European nations who found themselves on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain or those in the Baltics, there was the aspiration of NATO and European Union membership to attract them to a future of shared values and common security. In Central Asia, there are several multilateral organizations, but none that possess the same incentives for domestic reform and external reconciliation.

In fact, for the most part, the organizations that today are viewed as more relevant in Central Asia, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, lack the same common values, do not include European or U.S. membership, and are dominated by Moscow or Beijing.    This is why organizations such as the OSCE and the European Union need to be seen as more relevant in Central Asia.  But if Kazakhstan, which is viewed by most as the country within Central Asia with the greatest international weight, is not acceptable to the OSCE, then the countries of the region may believe what they are told by Moscow, that they will never be accepted by Europe or the United States as anything more than the "stans."

Unfortunately, the vast majority of Central Asians do not see the OSCE -- or Europe, for that matter -- as very relevant to them.  Most OSCE members do not have embassies in Central Asia.  Only Germany of the E.U. has embassies in all five Central Asian capitals. And OSCE only comes up when a diplomat wanting to distance his country a little bit cites an OSCE report when criticizing the country's democratic transition. The government, elite and population are often unaware of what benefits membership provides them and their country's future.  This has to change.

In my discussions, many in Vienna and Washington believe that the OSCE's future is the South Caucuses and Central Asia.  They see the need and opportunity for expanding stability and personal liberties to the millions of predominantly moderate Muslims in Central Asia. I do not believe that you can hold this view and be against Kazakhstan's candidacy.  If the OSCE were to reject Kazakhstan in Madrid, it would be sending a message that Europe and European values are not Central Asia's future in a time when we need to be providing an example of what their future could be, provided they have additional options rather than a reliance on Moscow and Beijing.

Only the United States, the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic oppose Kazakhstan's bid.  One argument put forward on why Kazakhstan should not be chairman-in-office is that they would be beholden to the Kremlin for the office and would therefore support Moscow's efforts to weaken the organization. This could be plausible if Moscow were one of Astana's only supporters but does not hold up given the breadth of Kazakhstan's support. Another stated argument is that because Kazakhstan does not itself have a fully developed democratic tradition, it will not be able or willing to be critical of other countries. But this has always been the case.  Countries have differed in how active they have been in their comments, which is why the independence of the OSCE's ODIHR, which conducts the election observations, is so important.

And another argument at times expressed about why Kazakhstan should not be chairman has to do with the questions of the professionalism or depth of their foreign ministry.  Can they do the job?

Kazakhstan -- without question, their foreign ministry can do the job.  We've had examples such as the case in Norway where they relied on their foreign ministry to provide functions of the OSCE, and Bulgaria, where they relied more on the OSCE's secretariat to carry out their agenda. And the troika, consisting of the previous, current and future chairman-in-office, also ensures that this will not be an issue. This decision will be reached by consensus of the members this November in Madrid.  If the United States blocks Kazakhstan's bid, I am sure that one of the 53 countries will block whomever we would suggest as chairman for 2009.

In my view, Kazakhstan will be successful in reaching their goal, and I would like them to see that they've done so with our support and not in spite of our opposition. The ambassador's already mentioned the accomplishments that President Nazarbayev and his government have made over the last 15 years, so I will not repeat those.

But finally, I'd like to point out that many opposition figures in Kazakhstan -- in fact, to my knowledge, I think a majority, but I don't think that can be judged -- support the government's OSCE goals. They do so for two main reasons.  First, national pride.  They would like to see their country on a larger stage taking a greater international role. And second, they believe that being chairman-in-office will place a greater spotlight on Kazakhstan and will help them in addressing issues they believe are important to them and Kazakhstan's democratic future. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today.  I appreciate your attention and look forward to your questions.

HASTINGS: 

Thank you very much, Mr. Merkel. We turn now to Dr. Robert Herman. Dr. Herman, you have the floor.

HERMAN: 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Representative Smith.  I'm very grateful for the opportunity to testify today before this commission on behalf of Freedom House on the important and timely issue of Kazakhstan's bid to become chairman-in-office of the OSCE in 2009.

The outcome of Kazakhstan's bid will have significant consequences for OSCE and for the future of democracy and human rights across Europe and Eurasia and beyond.

The oldest human rights organization in the U.S., Freedom House is an independent, nonprofit organization committed to the expansion of freedom worldwide. For 3.5 decades, we have chronicled the state of political rights and civil liberties in every country in the world, including in Kazakhstan since it became an independent state. We have also worked closely with some of Kazakhstan's leading human rights groups such as the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, represented here today.

Based on our extensive analysis and our on-the-ground experience, Freedom House believes strongly that the OSCE participating states should not make Kazakhstan chairman-in-office.

That prominent position should be reserved for governments with exemplary records on democratic reform and on safeguarding human rights, governments demonstrably committed to the core principles and values of the OSCE.

We at Freedom House look forward to the day when Kazakhstan becomes a fully democratic country and can assume the OSCE mantle of leadership.  But that day has not yet come.

A country that falls so far short of OSCE's own standards should not be accorded the privilege of becoming chairman-in-office, especially at a time when the organization's essential role in supporting democratic reform and human rights is under attack from within.

There is no question that Kazakhstan is a country of consequence by virtue of its substantial oil and gas production and its location in an important geostrategic region. We recognize that Kazakhstan has instituted some minor political reforms and that the twin processes of state-building and democratic change are formidable undertakings. We are also mindful that the U.S. has multiple interests with respect to Kazakhstan, the advancement of democratic governance among them.

But despite some tentative steps at political reform, Kazakhstan's overall dismal performance across the full range of democracy and human rights norms should preclude it from becoming OSCE chair.

The regime of President Nazarbayev systematically violates fundamental human rights and has configured the political system to prevent any serious political competition.  There is no check on executive power.  Both the parliament and the judiciary are subservient to central authority.

Media freedom is severely curtailed, effectively denying citizens access to independent sources of information.  Civil society, most notably human rights advocacy groups, faces formidable constraints on legitimate political activity. And low levels of government transparency and accountability have enabled corruption to flourish to the disproportionate benefit of the ruling elite.

Kazakhstan has yet to hold a national election that meets international standards, with both widespread election day irregularities and a sharply tilted playing field.

In Freedom House's three-tiered rating system, countries are categorized as free, partly free and not free.  Kazakhstan is firmly mired in the bottom tier and has been since 1995 when a new constitution gave unchecked powers to the president. Every single country that has served as OSCE chairman-in-office has been rated free by Freedom House.

That the OSCE might be chaired by a country with such a poor record in democratic governance and human rights would be a sad irony, particularly in the view of the fact that Kazakhstan has joined with other CIS countries in sharply criticizing OSCE's work in the key fields of election monitoring and promoting political and civil rights. The OSCE, which traces its proud history to the Helsinki Final Act, was pivotal in focusing international attention on the terrible state of human rights in the Eastern Bloc.  And in giving rise to Helsinki watch groups, it contributed in a major way to bringing the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion. More recently, the OSCE has been instrumental in supporting free and fair elections and pressing participating countries to uphold their commitments to respect human rights.

In addition to giving hope to freedom's advocates in Europe and Eurasia, OSCE also serves as a model for other regional organizations that have as part of their mandate the strengthening of democratic norms and human rights. The elevation to the chair-in-office post of a country so patently undeserving of that honor would severely undermine the credibility of this respected organization and send a dispiriting message to the courageous men and women struggling to advance the cause of human freedom in Kazakhstan and in other OSCE states.  Such an outcome would also threaten OSCE's proven effectiveness.

We cannot expect a government that routinely flouts the OSCE's own standards, whether on conducting free and fair elections or upholding human rights, to determinedly press participating states to live up to their human dimension commitments. The work of the OSCE in supporting human rights and democratic freedoms is too important to be placed in jeopardy by a chair-in-office that lacks a commitment to the organization's core values and which has criticized various of its efforts to bolster democratic governance.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by reiterating that Freedom House looks forward to the day when Kazakhstan achieves a level of democratic progress and respect for human rights commensurate with its aspirations to chair the OSCE and to be a significant actor on the international stage.

That time has not yet come, but the prospect of serving as chairman-in-office at some point in the future, combined with other positive inducements, will hopefully inspire the government and empower pro-democracy advocates in Kazakhstan to work collaboratively to implement far-reaching political reforms. However, at the present moment, for all the reasons elaborated here, Freedom House urges the governments of the United States and our European allies to oppose Kazakhstan's bid to become chairman-in-office for OSCE in 2009. Thank you, and I'll look forward to your questions.

HASTINGS: 

All right. Mr. Zhovtis, you have the floor.

ZHOVTIS: 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to speak at this hearing.

I already had a chance to speak here eight years ago, testifying on the problems with democratic process, human rights observance and rule of law in Kazakhstan.  A lot of critical points in that testimony have not changed, unfortunately, yet. Very soon the United States government will have to make a decision on its position regarding Kazakhstan's 2009 OSCE chairmanship. The United States, the United Kingdom and some other OSCE countries have held a relatively clear position on this issue, that Kazakhstan authorities must first demonstrate their commitment to its key principles and values in the human dimension and, to this end, undertake a number of specific, practical steps in democracy development, rule of law and respect for human rights. A number of other OSCE states, for economic and geopolitical reasons, have advanced the notion that Kazakhstan does not deserve but should get it.

Throughout these debates, I had supported Kazakhstani 2009 OSCE chairmanship, despite the fact that I am a human rights defender and committed to democratic convictions and believe that the government of Kazakhstan has a long way to go before it has fulfilled its human dimension obligations. Like many public activists, politicians, diplomats, democrats in my country, I believed that chairmanship would bring Kazakhstan closer to the European political arena.

I hoped that the chairmanship would strengthen (inaudible) democratic forces to European and U.S. policy and public opinion, since it's one thing when an OSCE participating state fails to fulfill its human dimension obligations, but it's another matter when the OSCE chair do so. I thought that it will be significantly more difficult for Western politicians to use the grossly inappropriate comparison between Kazakhstan on the one hand and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on the other, and to draw from this comparison positive conclusions about the situation (inaudible) political rights in Kazakhstan. I hoped that OSCE chairmanship would strengthen the position of the progressive liberal part of Kazakhstani elite and would advance the government's political and legal culture. I hoped that the OSCE chairmanship would strengthen the position of the progressive part of the elite and would advance the government's political and legal culture (inaudible). I also believed that denying Kazakhstani the chairmanship would worsen the situation in the country and would strengthen the position of ideologists of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the document for which make no mention of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights.

That would strengthen the influence of China and especially of Russia, countries that profess their own paths to democracy which resemble a modernized Russian or Soviet authoritarianism.

Nonetheless, my support for Kazakhstan as chairman was not unconditional. I have always called on Kazakhstan's authorities to demonstrate in 2006, 2007 political will to follow the letter and spirit of the OSCE founding Helsinki agreement and OSCE documents and to make concrete steps, including -- I'm listing -- register opposition of political parties, including (inaudible). Release the most recent political prisoner (inaudible). End politically motivated criminal cases against opposition leaders and activists and reexamine the verdicts against them. Provide opposition of political parties and movements unhindered access to nationwide mass media, which they have been essentially denied for the last 10 years. Enter into a civilized and constructive dialogue with opposition forces. End prosecution against the Krishna Consciousness Society and resolve the conflict with this religious community in a fair way. Bring into conformity with international standards legislation on elections, freedom of expression and media, peaceful assembly and (inaudible).

This was a very moderate list of steps that would have unambiguously shown that Kazakhstan's leadership was committed to fulfilling its OSCE obligations, its readiness to advance democracy, rule of law and human rights within the framework of the OSCE's principles. Had there been at least some confirmation that Kazakhstan's government had chosen to advance democratic (inaudible) in 2007, 2008, then although the country does not fully conform to OSCE principles, there would have been grounds to believe that it was nonetheless moving in that direction and its chairmanship in 2009 was a reasonable compromise, considering economic, security and geopolitical factors.

However, for the past 1.5 years, Kazakhstan's authorities have not met single one of these criteria.  Moreover, this summer's amendments to the constitution move the country even further from the principles of constitutional democracy. Consequently, results of parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan failed in the view of the OSCE mission to meet OSCE standards, as have all prior elections in the country during all 15 years of its existence and resulted this in single-party parliament.

Under these circumstances, supporting OSCE Kazakhstan's chairmanship in 2009 would transform this organization into a European version of the Shanghai Organization for Cooperation, would completely rob human dimension principles of any value, and would serve as a poor example to other CIS states with authoritarian regimes.

Thus, the "does not deserve but should get it" notion should be rejected and replaced with "not reject but postpone." Kazakhstan can count on the chairmanship in 2010, 2011, 2012, however only if it demonstrates its commitment to OSCE human dimension principles and values, not only through words but through concrete, practical steps in democratic development, rule of law and human rights protection, including those steps I outlined above. The same was noted in the statement made on the 11th of October by the meeting of Democratic Forces of Kazakhstan and signed by almost 50 most prominent democratic figures, political leaders, human rights defenders and independent journalists. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your attention.

HASTINGS: 

Thank you all very much. I'd like for you each as panelists to give some thought to a dialogue after Representative Smith and I make some inquiry of you. And if you are of a mind to ask each other questions -- I continue to look for a formula in the commission that will allow for a different kind of debate and dialogue, and so at least give some thought to that. And I especially am appreciative of the ambassador for agreeing to be on the same panel.  Normally we start with one panelist and then someone else, but he agreed, and I appreciate that very much, his willingness to dialogue with all of us. Toward that end, in light of the fact that he has commitments, I'm going to defer any questions I have and turn now to my friend, Commissioner Smith, for any questions he may have.

C. SMITH: 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that courtesy.  And again, this is a very timely hearing.

Let me just ask a couple of questions.  And I appreciate all of your testimonies, and I've read them, and I think they're very well formulated, and you've presented your views in the most persuasive way I think you could.

But you know, when I read -- Ambassador Idrissov, you know, you did say that you would respect -- or your country as the chair-in-office would respect all three baskets. And I'm not much of a gambler, especially when it comes to human rights and when it comes to democracy issues.  You know, we've seen this before.

When a country seeks a position, very often it claims that it will make amends after the fact rather than before.  And we're not talking about amends.  We're talking about substantive and systemic reform. Most recently with the Human Rights Council, a number of the countries that were now part of that Human Rights Council which was configured to replace the egregiously flawed Human Rights Commission, we have really gone out of the frying pan into the fire. There's very little difference.  It's been a seamless transition of rogue states sitting in judgment and running interference and ensuring that the spotlight, as you, Mr. Merkel, pointed out, is not brought to bear upon their records. The PRC, China, jumps off the page as a country that runs interference, as do some of these other countries.

And frankly, I have a very deep concern, with all due respect to Kazakhstan -- very deep concern -- given the signing of that letter in -- or that joint statement in July of '04, where double standards were alleged, where the CIS -- where the OSCE missions in CIS countries were criticized, that the ability to thwart, to dilute and even run interference on fundamental human rights scrutiny would be a possible result, just like we saw with the Human Rights Council.

Remember how that was vaunted as being, you know, this great follow on?  That hasn't happened.  It is a bitter disappointment, especially to the victims. So the question about the -- you know, Mr. Merkel, if you could speak to that.  I understand how the opposition folks in the country would say we want that, too. Really, they almost have to say that, even if there is a private thought that now is not the time.  They have to say it just for their own viability. But the idea that things could even get worse as the OSCE loses its edge and becomes a blunt instrument rather than, you know, something that is much more refined concerns me. And so that would be the first.  You know, we run that risk, like the Human Rights Council, that the spotlight becomes much dimmer.

Secondly, and if I could specifically to you -- and I appreciate the chairman's yielding to me -- the Jehovah's Witnesses -- and this would be to you, Mr. Ambassador -- will the government of Kazakhstan investigate why the Atyrau region justice department has not granted registration to Jehovah's Witnesses, despite four applications to register since '01 and four official religious expert studies of the literature of Jehovah's Witnesses? Secondly, on the Grace Presbyterian Church, which I mentioned in my opening comments -- that raid -- if you might want to speak to that issue.

And thirdly, on the Hare Krishna, we understand that some 26 homes have been destroyed, 116 acres of the community's land confiscated, and the OSCE Advisory Council on Freedom of Religion or Belief released a statement a year ago that these actions suggest that the Krishnas were targeted on the basis of their religious affiliation and raises serious issues regarding the enjoyment of the freedom of religion and belief in your country.

Three different denominations -- sects, if you will -- all having problems in what would clearly be seen from our point of view as being contrary to OSCE basic principles.             So if on those questions we could get some answers.

HASTINGS: 

Please, Ambassador?

IDRISSOV: 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I'd like to thank all the witnesses for their statements and points of views expressed, and I thank you for the invitation to have a dialogue. This was my -- actually, when I received an invitation to sit separately as a witness, I was surprised, because it was always my intention and it was always our desire to keep a dialogue. This is our culture which we are building in our country, and I appreciate very much the views expressed here.  Our life is life and views will not always be the same.  Everyone has the right to express his view, and we believe that we have every right to express our view, and we will also hope that others will respect our view.

So I heard a number of criticism before.  Representative Smith, I answer your question.  I'd like to say that I will be absolutely happy to go into detail if time permits to answer each and every point of criticism.   And I simply cannot and will never take the views expressed here by our distinguished friends -- for example, as the (inaudible) nature of our judiciary, (inaudible) nature of our legislature, et cetera, et cetera.          These are very strong remarks, and I want to strongly oppose to these remarks and place this on the record. We are building a new society.  We are building new institutions.  We are not saying that we are ideal.  We are on the growth.  Therefore, we are going through our teething problems, and we believe that this should deserve full understanding and appreciation on the part of our friends and partners.

I can address all the issues and give full details of my point of view on, for example, media access, constitutional reforms, the so-called issue of the lifetime presidency, Krishnates, registration of political parties. I believe that the information which has been provided here is wrong, and I am prepared to give full answers why it is wrong. Answering your question, Representative Smith, with regard to Jehovah, Presbyterian and Krishnates, I unfortunately am not aware of the Jehovah situation, but as in any country, there is an issue here.

First of all, one should not question the integrity and legitimacy of our court rulings.  Court and judiciary is a sacred cow which we try to build in our society.  I am not saying that our courts are ideal.  I am not saying that our judges are ideal.  They are not. But we are trying to achieve -- to go to that ideal.  In doing so, it will be a mistake to put to question the integrity of any court ruling in Kazakhstan.  There is a procedure, as in any country -- there is a procedure for simple registration by any religious organization. If there is some disorder with this procedure, a respective organization will ask to perfect this order.  All these are questions that (inaudible). With regard to particularly the Krishna situation, I had the opportunity to explain in full detail to Chairman Hastings and other members here that it is basically a property issue.

We are a society which build the culture of respecting the property rights.  Therefore, we believe that the whole issue is about property rights.  We have set up an independent commission which comprises representative of other religious, Muslim, Christian, Buddhist. We have included members of the parliament into that commission.  And we have included the members o the Krishna community itself.  Mr. Govinda (ph) from Kazakhstan Krishna community, the chair of that group, is within that commission. And we have included NGOs like Helsinki Commission of Kazakhstan, Helsinki Committee of Kazakhstan, in that commission, independent commission -- for them to review the ruling of the court, of different courts at different levels. And they have reviewed the ruling of these courts, and they have agreed that this is a property violation situation.  As simple as that. In Kazakhstan we have more than seven Krishna communities in different parts of the country, and none of them are facing any problems because none of them are having property disputes.

The only community in Almaty had the property dispute, and it is about a violation of property rights of other people.  And the commission came up with a very simple decision, please do rectify things which are done wrongly in making the property rights through the necessary paperwork.

And the ruling is the decision by the commission -- please do choose what we have to offer to you, and there is a process of a selection.  There is a discussion between the Krishna community and the authorities to find an amicable solution to this situation.

It is not about targeting particular religious group in Kazakhstan.  Kazakhstan has almost an impeccable record on promoting religious freedoms in Kazakhstan. We are the promoters of interfaith dialogue in our part of the world, and we have already convened two global congresses on this issue. Therefore, I strongly oppose to the notion that it is a targeting of one particular religious group.  It is about property rights.  It is about a violation of property rights of one group of people by another group of people. And the independent commission came with a solution offering to find an amicable decision through dialogue and discussion.

This would be my points of -- my responses to the critical comments and answers -- questions which have been asked here.  And I once again stress the point that please do not try -- I am not saying that we are ideal. My point is that we are a young emerging society.  Therefore, we try to put the ambitious goals in front of us, before us, and we are absolutely sure that we will achieve them.

We believe that there should be a recognition of the importance of these goals and ambitions.  It is like bringing up a child.  You see, if you always say to a child that he is wrong and bad, that child will have very few opportunities to grow as a full-fledged, responsible citizen. Therefore, every effort should be done to support and care those positive things which are emerging on the ground.  We are a young society, but we are confident that we'll develop into a fully fledged democracy liberal society.

And as I said, one should not overestimate the importance of a time factor.  One should not overestimate the importance of the emerging culture.  It is about the generation changes.  It is about the mentality changes. And these things do not happen overnight.  They cannot be achieved at one goal.  I thank you very much.

HASTINGS: 

Follow-up?

C. SMITH: 

Just would any other panelists like to speak to this, especially on the Krishna and the -- and you didn't really speak to the issue, with all due respect, Mr. Ambassador, to the Jehovah's Witnesses, so perhaps you could get to that.

But frankly, we want to treat Kazakhstan not as a child, but as an adult.  And you know, adults don't let adults commit human rights abuses.  Friends don't let friends commit human rights abuses.

That's what this is all about.  It's not about being critical.  It's about trying to speak truth to the power of your government so that corrective action for victims and disenfranchised people will occur. That's what this is all about.  Mr. Hastings and I want nothing better -- and other members of this commission -- to applaud Kazakhstan.  That's what this is all about. But when we get credible reports of ongoing mischief, if you will -- you know, you said almost impeccable.  It's not about almost or anything.  It's about the victims.  That's what we care about, the victims -- rule of law, accountability, transparency.

HASTINGS: 

Would any of the others want to speak to that? Mr. Zhovtis?

ZHOVTIS: 

Thank you a lot, because we have a dialogue.  I want to respond to some key issues. Number one, I agree with the ambassador that we are a young democracy, but who are the young democracy?  We should move from the younger to more adult.  We should move forward. If you look at the Kazakhstan 1993, you will find out there are a lot of opposition political parties registered.  You could find independent T.V. and radio, which we have no now. You could find some kind of (inaudible) functions of parliament over the executive branch of power.  You could find some roots of democracy in the early '90s which we now didn't have in place.

And this is the problem.  The problem is that constitution and the laws are not became better, are not becoming more democratic. They're becoming more authoritarian, more control function given to the executive branch of power, more involvement of special services for prosecutors' offices, and so on, and so on, and so on. That the question of (inaudible) of development and the development of (inaudible) is not the question of -- is not the problem of questioning the young democracy as such.

What is concerns the Krishna community (inaudible) I was also the member of this commission, which was established under the committee on religious affairs of ministry of justice. I want to remind that it's not the question of integrity of the justice.  It's a question of the OSCE standard for free and fair trials.  And free and fair trials should be forward. That should be open, transparent procedure where everybody could provide its evidence and so on.  It couldn't be that the hearings were held without the defendants at all, as it happens in the supreme court of Kazakhstan. What about the commission?  Unfortunately, the commission was established exactly several days before the religious forum, and it seems it was some kind of window dressing, because we never reviewed anything.       There was only two technical meetings, and that's all, and after that we have the decision of the commission where we are the members.  I haven't even seen any hearings, any discussion on the issues.  It was only technical procedural things. Property rights -- yes, of course, the property should be protected, and so on, and so on.  But when you see the selective approach, when you see that the owners should mention their religious affiliation, and because of that those who belong to the Krishna community -- their houses are demolished, and those who do not belong, their houses were not demolished, in spite of (inaudible) that the same legal status was for everybody for all owners of this land.

Unfortunately, the legal situation was very complicated, of course, but there were opportunities to solve the problem in a fair and a good faith way.  It was if the government want to do so. The government didn't do anything to solve the problem in a good faith.  It was they hide themselves behind the court decisions which were made in untransparent and unfair way.

HASTINGS: 

Mr. Zhovtis, let me ask you another question, though.  The ambassador said that there are other Krishna communities that do not have property disputes that have ongoing opportunities to explore their religion. Is that true?

ZHOVTIS: 

It's relatively true, because there are seven very small communities which have no places for worship and have no property at all, that they have not face any problems, and other -- it is the center.  It is the center of Krishna community in Kazakhstan.

HASTINGS: 

I follow you.  I follow you, but my point would be if it was that the government was being totally intolerant, it would seem to me that the Krishnas would not have an opportunity to proceed at any place, and I've seen those, as have...

(CROSSTALK)

ZHOVTIS: 

There was a selective approach, unfortunately.  There was a selective approach. In this case, it was some kind of selective approach, and you could find out -- very interesting -- two things, that when you see in the T.V. how the high-rank official of the local executive branch said that the Krishna community -- that even Indians deny the Krishna community.        How you could measure that, what I said, it's clear...

HASTINGS: 

Well, I don't want to get bogged down.  We could be here forever about religion. And I consider it critical -- Ambassador, by all means, I will hear you, sir.  But I did want to try to carry us into some other directions as well.  But go ahead, Ambassador.

IDRISSOV: 

Yes, just a couple of facts.  Again, I full respect what our friends express here, but I do not want to impose my opinion in whatever way.  Simply a couple of facts. In this situation with Krishna, it was believed -- and it was widely disseminated that the government or certain groups within the locality, with the support of local authorities, tried to take out the land from Krishnates for certain commercial needs, because the land is very expensive there. I can give you the fact that not all the houses of the Krishnates have been taken away.  Those who had proper paperwork for their property titles -- they have been allowed to continue to own that property, so it is not that it is being (inaudible) on the massive scale because you are Krishna.  It is a wrong picture, completely wrong picture. And second fact is that the land which has been retrieved is given for an orphanage.  It's not being turned into a highly valuable commercial property or whatever.  It has been given for an orphanage. And again, this fact proves that the rumors which were spread were baseless.  Thank you very much.

C. SMITH: 

With all due respect...

HASTINGS: 

Go right ahead, Mr. Smith.

C. SMITH: 

... confiscated properties remains one of the most compelling issues as a holdover from the Nazi era, the Communist era. And to think that confiscated properties are occurring real-time, now, raises very serious questions, especially as Kazakhstan is seeking to be the chair-in-office. You know, there's always a pretext.  There's always, you know, the papers -- your papers were not in order.  We hear that all the time.  And whenever the commission gives an explanation like that, it's very disturbing. I do think a few of the others wanted to answer.

HASTINGS:

 I want to accelerate us to another posture, and I fully respect the dialogue that has been ongoing.

But I'm curious, and I guess I put it to you, Dr. Herman.  Some people maintain that allowing Kazakhstan to chair the OSCE will bring them into the fold -- and Mr. Zhovtis earlier, before his "however," had postured that that was his belief earlier, before subsequent changes that took place brought him on -- rather than shutting them out, and by taking leadership in an institution dedicated to upholding basic human rights and democracy, Kazakhstan can't help but be influenced by their chairman-in-office tenure if they were to have that opportunity. How would you respond to this argument?  And while you are preparing your thoughts on it, you know, I was elected as the first American to be the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE.

And, Mr. Merkel, I just want to correct (inaudible) go forth a lot of times people say when election monitoring -- you talked about your experiences -- takes place -- ODIHR is always mentioned, and rightly so. But the Parliamentary Assembly also conducts portions of those determinations, and I, for one, was the lead observer in the Kazakh elections previous to the more recent one, and while I made the declaration, that declaration was on behalf of ODIHR, NATO, the Council of Europe and others. But I also had my personal witness, and I can tell you I'm from Florida, and I saw things in Kazakhstan that were substantially improvements over whatever that mess is we have in Florida.

So when you look at it with another kind of lens, not suggesting by any stretch of the imagination that there were not problems, but, my goodness gracious, you know, we need to be mindful when we are highlighting these particular matters.

And back to you, Dr. Herman.  When I was elected as president of the Parliamentary Assembly, there was criticism from a lot of the countries, France being lead among them, that an American should not be the president of the assembly, that I would bring all of whatever it is in America to Europe, and I wouldn't be fair and objective and what have you.

And I doubt very seriously now if any of the persons in the Parliamentary Assembly would argue that my two-year tenure was not tinged with complete objectivity on a variety of subjects that are just as controversial as this one, ranging all the way from something that the American Congress is considering, the Armenian-Turkish disputes, the Greek-Turkish disputes, the Russian-European disputes. And I balanced myself, taking myself to another level, in an effort to try to bring parties together and to fulfill the mandate of the OSCE. And I haven't personally been persuaded why Kazakhstan can't do the same thing.  When you cite to me their human rights violations, I can cite to you in the state of Florida what I perceive to be a serious human rights violate. And I know we are free, and the highest of the free, of those.  But last week, a terrible injustice took place in the state of Florida with reference to a kid that was killed in a juvenile detention facility. Now, I could go on and on and on.  I don't want to bring up Guantanamo.  I've held hearings here about that.  I don't want to talk about Abu Ghraib.  I don't want to talk about black (inaudible) and what have you. But when other countries look at us and then we may be the ones that hold up their opportunities to come inside the fold, I personally would rather be in a position of having Kazakhstan be influenced by their opportunities.

And following with what Mr. Merkel said, having the troika, outgoing and incoming, person to work with, they couldn't help but improve.  And how do you respond to that, even in the area of human rights?

HERMAN: 

Thank you for your questions.  Let me start by going to the point you mentioned about the deficiency in the United States, and I know that's not the subject of the hearing, but it's relevant here that no country is perfect. All democracies are in a path, a trajectory, of perfecting their institutions.

What I would say to you, though, the difference is, in a country like the United States and many of the other established democracies, what you have is self-correcting mechanisms such that when there are problems, you have the institutions, including a free press, including a vibrant civil society.  You have an independent court.

All those things are checks on executive power and the balance of power, as we've talked about.  And those are absent in transition countries, certainly in authoritarian countries, like Kazakhstan.

So there is not the self-correcting mechanisms that we would see in the more established democracies.  That's one point.

The second one is the historical record is filled with cases where letting in countries that don't meet the standards -- it is not a spur to further democratic reform.  Lowering the bar has the impact of doing just that, of lowering the overall standards of the organization.

Now, I should say to you that Freedom House -- when we do our annual reports, Freedom in the World and other things, it is not just a naming and shaming exercise. The reason we do those reports is exactly to do what you suggested before, engage those governments in a dialogue about how to move the democratic process forward.  It's pointing out some of the shortcomings, but it's for the basis of a conversation.

And more importantly, not a conversation just that Freedom House has with those governments, but that those governments should have with their own citizens. It would please us to no end to see human rights organizations like the one that Yevgeniy represents engaging with their government on a dialogue about what needs to happen to move that country forward. And as you heard, the democratic opposition, the leading human rights organizations, in Kazakhstan do not believe that bringing in Kazakhstan as the chairman-in-office at this time is going to be the answer, is going to be a spur to further democratic reforms.

If you take the example, let's say, of the European Union, in my experience that has been a very, very powerful incentive for governments to undertake reforms in order to bring them into conformity with the requirements of E.U. membership. Those countries didn't get a free pass.  They didn't come in when they were at the very, very bottom.  They only came in admitted to the E.U. after they had achieved certain levels or standards of that organization. I would say that that would also be the case with Kazakhstan.  I am all for putting together a blueprint, a road map, of what Kazakhstan needs to do in order to get to the point that it will inspire the confidence of the other members.

HASTINGS: 

I take your point, and I'm going to just cut you off so that others...

HERMAN: 

Thank you.

HASTINGS: 

... including Representative Smith, could have something to say. And you know, I'm no rookie in all of this stuff.  You talk about the other countries that came into the E.U.  Romania came into the E.U. and I can sit here and cite to you countless problems that still exist there, including -- I'm sitting here with the world's leader on the subject of human trafficking, and I can tell you if Romania doesn't have a serious problem, then I know of no country that does. So we can go back and forth in that regard, and I particularly enjoy the dialogue in that regard. Ambassador? And then, perhaps, Chris has something else. And I don't want to overlook you at all, Mr. Merkel.  I'll come back to you.

IDRISSOV: 

Thank you very much.  Quickly, on the point Representative Smith raised about the confiscation, it is exactly about protecting property rights.  It is not the confiscation.  It is about the protection of the property rights, which we build as a sacred cow in our society. Now, coming back to elections, you have touched upon the election process in Kazakhstan.  May I respectfully remind all the participants today that we have had more than five elections over this short period of 15 years? And a discussion of the election process as we have it here sometimes may create a picture that we are kind of -- in a kind of a conflict with OSCE.  On the contrary, we are very close partners with OSCE, particularly with ODIHR. If you look at the record of our partnership and the work with ODIHR, you will see that every election, every election, is being described as an improvement. This election -- the report of the ODIHR mission says -- the first line of the report says it is a work in progress.  A lot has been done, and this election, as compared to the previous election, was much better in terms of the opposition parties' status, in terms of the access to the media. And you will have full details of this, full account of this, in the report of OSCE.

HASTINGS: 

But, Ambassador, in the intervening time, the sanction that the parliament allowed in order that the president would be president for life -- you said in your remarks earlier that you would address that subject and dispel the myth of the presidency for life. I'd like to hear that.

IDRISSOV: 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.  It is absolutely correct that it is not true.  It is not a lifetime presidency.  What the parliament -- it is a set of 40 amendments to the constitution. One amendment was to fix two terms for the president, reducing the term from seven years to five years.  So each and every president in the future will have two five-term periods for the presidency. In recognition of the unique set of circumstances this time, the parliament has voted for the right to this president, first president of the country, to run for the third time, if he chooses so. And he will not stand unopposed.  This was not a presidential decree.  This was an independent decision by the M.P.s, by the elected members of the parliament, to give the exceptional right to the current president for the -- to run for the third time, to run. If there will be -- and he will run against other candidates which emerge by the year 2012 when we expect next election, so -- and if he chooses.  This is an opportunity for the society to encourage the growth of political leaders in the country (inaudible) by political parties in the country.

HASTINGS: 

So you're saying he didn't reach his decision on the constitutional amendment that allows him to be president for life along with the admonition that he gave to President Putin that President Putin ignore constitutional restrictions and Western criticism and simply remain in office. And I quote President Nazarbayev, who you know that I've had the pleasure of sitting and talking with.  I quote him.  He said to Putin to remain in office "as long as the country needs you." Now, then, that didn't factor in President Nazarbayev's decisions with reference to what the members of parliament did, allowing that he succeed  himself for the...

IDRISSOV: 

No.  This is, on the contrary, a concept of a safety valve.  If the situation will have a danger of going into (inaudible) situation, then he would have the exceptional right to run for the third time, to run, not unopposed. And this was not his decision.  This was an independent decision by the elected members of the parliament, which he couldn't overrun, because by constitution a president cannot overrun the ruling by the parliament. That was as simple as that.

HASTINGS: 

Mr. Merkel, you have not had an opportunity to get in this with us.  Go ahead.

MERKEL: 

I wanted to touch on Congressman Smith's dim light question, which -- I noted that you addressed a dim light question to me.  I think Russia is actively working to dim the light of the OSCE.

In the name of reform, they are trying to make the organization weaker.  But in the case of Central Asia, I don't think that Kazakhstan would participate in this effort, and I don't think the comparison is right for them to be chairman would naturally dim the light. Also, with just a heart toward Central Asia, there were three organizations that were invited to observe the elections in Kazakhstan -- OSCE/ODIHR, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the first election observation by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

I think at a certain point, with the number of elections that Kazakhstan has had, with the number of elections that have taken place in Central Asia and the Caucuses, and the OSCE providing recommendations, we have to also look not just why these countries aren't improving at a more accelerated pace, but why the OSCE and others of us are not more effective in encouraging progress. We can keep the OSCE under glass and make sure that nothing happens to it, or, in my view, we can make it a more effective instrument in the regions that many believe are their raison d'etre heading into the future. And I think that this is a pivotal point in time that if the organization -- although 53 members of the organization don't feel this way, but if the U.S., the U.K., Czech Republic refuse Kazakhstan's bid, then I fear that the organization will be even less effective in trying to influence progress in this region.

And finally, I have great admiration -- not just sitting here; I have great admiration always for the two of you in your pursuit of human rights.  I've worked in Congress long enough to know that you're both champions of this.         I do kind of understand why Kazakhstan chafes a little bit in hearing of important issues when they're doing so many other things well.  They need to hear about them.

But when Bobby, who comes from a great organization and himself -- I've known for many years -- and does great things, talks about that we need to do positive incentives to get their progress, positive inducements, I'm reminded of all we did to bring NATO members into the fold. And that was a point in time when many of the issues from the Holocaust were resolved.  And we put money toward it.  We provided them the opportunity to sit at a table that meant great things.  It meant more stability for future economic progress.  It was a stepping stone toward E.U. membership, which is very different from OSCE membership. And I don't see that same effort.  And if you're sitting in one of the Central Asian capitals, I think what you hear is conditionality, not a road map of how we can work together to make sure that you're successful.

HASTINGS: 

Did we pass out the questionnaires?  And anyone in the audience that may have received them, would you bring them up so that we -- oh, they haven't been passed out?  We'll pass them out, and maybe we'll get one or two questions from someone in the audience.

I've been trying, Chris, really, to lessen the podium and bring the audience into these matters.

I want to follow up on Mr. Merkel's point and ask you again, Dr. Herman -- I understand and have great respect, as you know, for Freedom House's activities, scoring, methodologies.  I don't come to quarrel.

But on something of this magnitude, if you relegate yourself to just your niche, which largely is in the field of human rights, then you would not score Kazakhstan favorably in that area, and I accept how you come to your conclusion. But what do you with the close cooperation that Kazakhstan has with the United States of America in nonproliferation and counterterrorism?  And do they not have an opportunity to get scored a little bit favorably on matters of that magnitude? Senator, how are you? Yes?

HERMAN: 

Mr. Chairman, I think that's obviously for you and for the State Department and other members of the administration to judge.

I made the point in my comments that we recognize that the U.S. government has multiple interests with respect to Kazakhstan and that the promotion of democracy and human rights being just one of them. I worked in the State Department on the policy planning staff, so I know some of the debates that take place internally with the administration. What I can say and what President Bush has said is that we've learned the lesson that when you ignore democracy and human rights, you do so at your peril.  And if you're looking at long-term stability in Central Asia and elsewhere, if you're looking at reliable allies, look to how those governments treat their own people.

At a minimum, it seems to me, that should be a standard that we should demand of any country that would be chair-in-office of the OSCE. I do not see how you can expect a chair-in-office that has not lived up to its commitments as a participating state -- that when they're catapulted to the chair-in-office that they're suddenly going to develop the political will to undertake the kind of systemic reforms that Representative Smith was talking about.

HASTINGS: 

Right.  Well, you could kind of get ready for Kyrgyzstan at some point in the future.  I've been speaking with their good offices and have been told that they intend to make a bid, and it will be interesting to see how that plays out. And at the very same time, I think it important that we score the positives that countries produce in Central Asia, and I also think that we take into consideration a variety of positives and the negatives, and take into consideration those things that not only promote human rights and democracy but also that support and promote security. And in this particular instance, looking long range, I think we have some critical decisions that need to be made before November, and there is talk out there in the realm of Kazakhstan putting off until the year 2011.

But I was wondering what other countries would come forward.  What consequences might obtain by virtue of Kazakhstan not being permitted to be chair-in-office? And don't drop the dime on the United States.  There are some other countries that feel pro and con about this matter as well.  And I just am grateful that we have an opportunity to air it. And I believe the ambassador and his country will feel good about the fact that there is a robust discussion ongoing here in the United States as well as in the Congress.

We've been joined by Senator Cardin, and I know he has a full statement that will be submitted for the record. But if there is anything that you would like to add at this time, Senator, we'll leave the floor to you.

CARDIN: 

Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And, Mr. Ambassador, it's a pleasure to have you before our committee.  We thank you very much.  Kazakhstan is an extremely important country in OSCE as well as in our foreign policy considerations. So from both the point of view of OSCE and the United States, it's a real pleasure to have you before our committee. And I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, my statement being made part of the record. I must say I am conflicted here, because I think it's important that we look at the next plateau of leadership within OSCE, that we have a more effective organization in dealing with the important agenda that OSCE brings to all of its member states, including human rights advancements, including the economic and environmental and security dimensions. And I think it's important that we figure out ways that we can better understand the challenges that each of our states face.  I personally do not expect to see overnight change that would be, in my view, consistent with the OSCE commitments.

But I am concerned about the lack of political progress within Kazakhstan, and it's something that is troubling to me, and ones in which we need to have a better understanding before moving forward on supporting a leadership change within OSCE. So I look forward to reviewing your testimony today and the exchanges that have taken place with the members of the commission.  But I just really want you to know I'm open.  I'm open for suggestions, because I do think that OSCE has been compromised in the last couple years.

The relationship with the Russian Federation has caused severe concerns about the effectiveness of OSCE.  So I do think we have to reach out and figure out ways to be more inclusive within OSCE.

I would also hope we would look at changes within the mechanism.  The relationship between the capitals and Vienna needs to be reviewed, because it's causing a bureaucratic problem in dealing with a lot of these issues. The consensus requirements, I think, need to be reviewed also.  And I think these are all issues that we need to explore as to whether the chair-in-office will be aggressive in seeking those types of reforms needed within OSCE.

So yes, I am concerned about Kazakhstan's records on fundamental issues that are important for a country that seeks to have the chair-in-office.  But I am also concerned about the commitments made toward reform within OSCE. And we'll be very much looking at those types of conversations during the next -- I hope immediately, I mean, because time is running out on making decisions here, so that we can make an informed decision here. And I'm not sure it's a yes or no issue, because there is a timing issue, whether it's this year or next year or the following year.  I think these are all issues that we need to talk about in a very open way as to when is the best time for the types of transitions within OSCE. So I very much appreciate this hearing.  I think it's extremely important.  And I can tell you that the committee I serve on in the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee, is very much interested in what's taking place here in this committee today. And very much appreciate the openness, Mr. Ambassador, of your participating in this meeting.  I think it's extremely valuable...

HASTINGS: 

Yes.

CARDIN:

 ... to the process, and I thank you very much for your attendance here today.

HASTINGS: 

Thank you, Senator. Gentlemen, I'd ask you all to stand alert. And, Ambassador, you're going to have an opportunity.  But add some of these questions to the thought that you have there, if you could just put a pin in it right for a moment. These are questions from the audience, and I'm trying to establish a tradition where the tremendous experts and feelings of others, other than those of you who are experts and those of us who are pretenders, get to talk, and the audience doesn't have an opportunity. So here are some questions, and some of them are rather pointed.  Kazakhstan's actions toward the OSCE are important.  The country blocked the OSCE budget several years ago and brought it to a -- and I couldn't make out the word, but from closure is -- near closure, I guess, is what the scrivener is saying.  President Nazarbayev has threatened to withdraw from OSCE over 15 years.  Why do we want to reward this democratic child with a reward it has not earned? And what is the -- next question.  What is the state of the dialogue between the Kazakh government and civil society?

And again for you, Ambassador Idrissov, why has Kazakhstan joined Russia in promoting reforms of ODIHR's election observation role which would compromise the independence of ODIHR?

And would Kazakhstan be opposed to a 2011 bid?  Why does it have to be in 2009?

And, Mr. Merkel, I don't know -- I'm putting the question.  I'm not seeking this answer unless you choose.  On whose behalf is Mr. Merkel testifying?  Who is he employed by today in giving his testimony?

And for Mr. Zhovtis, why has Kazakhstan moved away from its generally good record of tolerance and human rights of 10 years ago?  And how would a Kazakhstan chairmanship affect the work of ODIHR, OSCE?

Ambassador, I'll start with you, or start with someone else if you want to collect your thoughts.  Yes, sir.

IDRISSOV: 

Thank you very much.  First of all, let me express my full appreciation to Senator Cardin and for his kind words. And I would like to, first of all, address the questions which have been asked for me, and then I want to make a point of -- a general observation. On the budget, budgetary issues in any multilateral organization is a complex issue.  Therefore, if something happened five years ago, it was not the intention, I'm sure, of Kazakhstan to block -- maybe there was a point of clarification of budgetary spendings, et cetera, et cetera.            And once again, this shows that we are quite responsible and sober in our membership in the organization. As far as the quote, would-be quote, of President Nazarbayev saying that we will withdraw from the organization, I didn't see that quote, but I think that this quote (inaudible) has been taken out of context and should not be commented as such.

But Kazakhstan and its leader always confirmed their full appreciation and respect to organization and our openness and willingness to develop this (inaudible) further.

The dialogue with the civil society is ongoing.  I will take you back to Kazakhstan 15 years ago when the notion of an NGO was absolutely unfamiliar to anyone in Kazakhstan.  Now in Kazakhstan we have more than 5,000 NGOs.  This will tell you what kind of a dialogue we are developing with civil society. And actually, the (inaudible) is putting together a number of practical efforts in terms of programs and budgeting these programs to develop this meaningful dialogue further. We believe that the civil society is an important part of our growth.  We believe that civil society is an important backbone of our society.  Therefore we want to encourage the further meaningful and quality growth of the civil society, and we are in dialogue with them.

On ODIHR, we have an excellent -- I started to address this issue.  We have an excellent relation with ODIHR.  We are in a permanent dialogue.  And we simply take this dialogue as a friendly and fair dialogue. ODIHR is not ideal, as Kazakhstan is not ideal either.  We believe that there are points of perfection for both of us.  Therefore, we engage ourselves in this meaningful dialogue.

We believe that we have full right to point to the areas of criticism as we believe to ODIHR, and we full respect the right of ODIHR to point at the areas of criticism as they believe. Therefore, we are in a permanent dialogue, and it is not that we want to undermine ODIHR.  On the contrary, we want to enhance the integrity and the future of ODIHR. We believe that this organization is very important, and we will be supporting ODIHR in our future chairmanship if we have the privilege to be elected.

Why 2009?  Because 2003 and the beginning of 2000, of the 21st century, actually brought enormous progress in Kazakhstan's economic and political growth. Our philosophy was to concentrate on economic growth and stability.  We believe that this is the basis to usher in meaningful, important political reforms, which we are trying to do now.        Actually, the constitutional reforms are the first step of our major focused work on political reforming of the country.  This is just a first step.  And the election which we had is the first step.  It's not the final destination. We understand that the final destination is far ahead of us, and we quite understand that for Western standards, this one-party parliament which we have after the election is something which is strange.  We understand this completely. But I draw attention of distinguished members here to the words of the president when he said immediately after the election that he was sorry that not all the parties were able to make it to the parliament. But he said that all ideas which have been voiced by the opposition parties -- they will be taken full on board on the constructive basis.  And he stressed that all the voters who supported opposition parties will be heard and their interests will never be ignored. And this is not the last election.  We believe that we'll have many more elections.  And this was simply a point when opposition parties were weaker.

And Mr. Zhovtis will agree with me that the whole point is that (inaudible) president is enjoying a lot of popularity in the country and the vote which we had last August was a fair vote, because electors in Kazakhstan that had the opportunity to make a free choice, as they have in the previous presidential elections, when strong opposition leaders were given the right to stand for elections.

There were no restriction opposition leaders.  There were no restriction on opposition parties, et cetera, et cetera.  We are a growing society, and we now started -- and we are making major announcement to the world:  Look, we have built economic muscles.  Now, we strong enough to think more meaningfully about protecting ourselves politically. This is the message we are sending to the rest of the world and to our partners like the United States.  thank you very much.

HASTINGS: 

Thank you very much.

CARDIN: 

Could I just, Mr. Ambassador, follow up one issue that you did not cover? And that is Russia has put forward a proposal in OSCE election monitoring which is viewed as a Russian proposal to significantly weaken the traditional role of OSCE in monitoring elections, something that our delegation, our commission, has taken very much as a priority to strengthen, not weaken, the election monitoring procedures. We think we understand the motivation of the Russian Federation, and it's something that we will have to deal with.  We were disappointed to see that your country co-sponsored that. And I thought that that appeared to be an accommodation to the Russian Federation which is -- one of the things we're looking for is the independence of your country in leadership within OSCE. And I wanted to give you an opportunity to respond as to the co-sponsorship of that resolution.

IDRISSOV: 

Yes, with regard to the co-sponsorship, I explained the rationale behind our co-sponsorship.  As I said, we want to be a responsible chairman of the organization. And we believe that there is room within the organization to further perfect itself.  ODIHR is a very important, indispensable instrument within the OSCE.  We fully recognize that. But we believe that since the practice of election is diverse within the space of organization, therefore we believe that ODIHR, through its engaged dialogue with all the membership of OSCE, can further perfect its performance in terms of monitoring the election. We fully understand that this is a very important element of OSCE activity and ODIHR.  Therefore, by sponsoring this -- co-sponsoring this resolution, we voiced our recognition of the need to work further with ODIHR to make it better, to improve the function of ODIHR in monitoring the elections.  That's it.

CARDIN: 

I would suggest that that would be perhaps perceived more favorably if it was an independent initiative by your country. But joining the Russian Federation, which has had such a difficult record of late with election monitoring issues, puts you with a country that is just not credible in its belief that it's trying to strengthen ODIHR.

IDRISSOV: 

Mr. Senator, quite respectfully, I have the experience in working in multilateral organizations, and sometimes resolutions are being sponsored and co-sponsored, as it is the practice in OSCE, in the United Nations, et cetera, et cetera. But I will tell you that we have made our opinion heard independently on improvements of different elements and different institutions within ODIHR -- within OSCE. So the fact of co-sponsoring the resolution where the main sponsor was Russia is not the fact that we are going to play in the hands of anyone.  We will be playing in the hands of interest of Kazakhstan and in the interest of the organization itself.

HASTINGS: 

Mr. Zhovtis, a question was put directly to you.  Do you remember the question?

ZHOVTIS: 

Yes, of course.  I think what happened 10 years ago when the constitution signed in '95 was adopted -- it was the shift in the policy from liberal democratic past to more authoritarian. It was explained that it is because of the need to develop economy, to make privatization process more or less controlled, and so on and so on. But (inaudible) it was very clear turning around, because a lot of things happened during that time, and oppositional political parties practically disappeared from the political arena, independent media, especially electronic -- I mean T.V. and radio -- practically disappeared from the Kazakhstan political scene.

And I disagree with Mr. Ambassador -- I agree that Mr. Nazarbayev and Party Nur Otan, of course, gathered much more public support.  But to some extent, it's the result of some narrowing political space for others. You could find some leaders of political opposition which were arrested and put in prison, and some are in exile, and it was politically motivated travel in spite of the fact that, of course, Mr. Ambassador could refer to the, quote, decisions. It was the lack of access to national wide media, national wide mass media, and if you have no access to national wide mass media, you could not bring your programs, your platforms, to the voters. You have the problems with the registration.  The country with a 15 million population needs 50,000 signatures to create and register political party. And it's practically -- very complicated procedure of registration, and some political parties are still denied registration. There is a lot of (inaudible) constraints in the (inaudible) which leads to certain results, because no matter how we are conducting and technically make better the election as such.

And one thing I want also to mention -- when we're talking about stability, we should keep in mind that at this point in Kazakhstan it is personal stability, stability based on one person, which is the center of the political system. It is not institutional stability, and it's a very big risk that if this personal stability will (inaudible) and will be not replaced by an institutional stability, by (inaudible) institutional -- institutions of the constitutional democratic state, it will be at risk.

And the last question was about what happens if Kazakhstan will chair OSCE.  I have some questions which I could not answer myself. When Kazakhstan came out with this bid for OSCE chairmanship, the democratic forces, human rights organizations, international community came out with this moderate list of some practical steps to show its commitment to the OSCE obligation.

Why Kazakhstan did not do these?  It was very few -- registration of political parties, improvement of the legislation on peaceful assembly and so on.  Why it has not happened during this 1.5 years?

Thus, I could not say how the government of Kazakhstan will do it the best, if it will receive this high position.  It's very unclear, because during this 1.5 years -- and I'm already repeating -- it was unclear why (inaudible) we finish with these elections which fell far short from international standards.  Thank you.

HASTINGS: 

All right.   Dr. Herman and Mr. Merkel, if each of you would take a minute, and then I'm going to read two more questions and allow the ambassador to take and have the last word.       So if I could just hold you to a minute, I would appreciate it.

HERMAN: 

Let me just make one point, which is that the ambassador had said, and we quite agree, that the question becomes how to move the country forward.  And I think what we've heard today is that the preconditions for doing that don't now exist in Kazakhstan. So yes, we need a dialogue with Kazakhstan.  Yes, we need to incentivize how we would put in place democratic reforms.  But as you just heard from Yevgeniy Zhovtis, those conditions don't now exist in Kazakhstan. So the basic building blocks to get to the point at which Kazakhstan could meet its OSCE -- the OSCE standards and its other commitments under international obligations, whether it's a free press, whether it's a level playing field for the political opposition -- because those things don't now exist, I have very little confidence that Kazakhstan is on a trajectory of profound political change.

In fact, I think what we're seeing and what we've heard is that they've really gone backwards, and I think that we've seen those initial years after 1991, after the independence, where some of those conditions did exist on the ground, it did seem like Kazakhstan was on a trajectory to move more in that direction. Now that process has been short-circuited.

MERKEL: 

I was asked on whose behalf I'm here today, and I feel quite Kissinger-esque, where after being involved with the opening of China because of the appreciation of the importance of China, when you speak about China afterwards people would think that it must be because he has business interests in China.

When I was at the White House, I was very opportune to be involved in the strengthening of our strategic partnership, of bringing -- President Nazarbayev and President Bush had the opportunity to meet -- and a joint statement providing a direction for our future relations. When I was asked to speak here, I thought the commission quite appropriately asked me if I had business interests involved.  I do not.  I have no business interest with Kazakhstan or with companies that are involved with Kazakhstan.

I think that this is important because it's important to the United States of America.  And I would just -- want to touch on one topic that Senator Cardin mentioned, which is the independence of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan pursues a multivector foreign policy.  They want to have good relationships in their neighborhood.  They want to have good relationships with major powers.  Our interest is not to wean Kazakhstan away from Russia.  History, diaspora, education, culture would make that unsuccessful. Our goal should be to preserve our access and influence in the region and provide more options for the countries in the region, where they don't always have to look to Russia or China, but there is a good path toward Europe and European values. And that should be our goal, to where they can cut better deals on a lot of different issues because they have more options.

HASTINGS: 

You cite to something that I think is not highlighted here among us policy makers, and that is the multivectoring that Kazakhstan does. More specifically, if they were to be the chair-in-office, their interface with the Shanghai group would be of immense importance. But I don't think a lot of policy makers even know that the Shanghai group is of substantial import -- not those of us, and maybe many in this room.  I'm talking about folk that just simply are not mindful of ongoing events.

I have another belief as well.  For example, when I first went to Kazakhstan, I had an opportunity to meet with all of the officials and Mr. Zhovtis, with opposition persons.  As a matter of fact, I had a whole day of discussions with members of the opposition. And my second visit I had an opportunity to meet with President Nazarbayev.  And it was after Hurricane Wilma, and I had traveled with President Bush to Florida to review the damage there on Air Force One.

And President Bush was mindful that I was going to meet with President Nazarbayev, so he gave me a message, not anything secret, but a message to carry to President Nazarbayev. And I told President Nazarbayev I was going from there to Uzbekistan, and so he gave me a message to give to President Karimov, and I'm saying to myself, "Who am I, the presidential courier here for these people?"

But the point that I wish to make is Kazakhstan's relationship with other Central Asian countries is of critical import with reference to the future. And OSCE's future in large measure must contemplate the Central Asian countries in a manner that I believe that Kazakhstan could help in developing stronger missions and allowing discussions with those countries, including the new opportunities in Turkmenistan, and I cited earlier to Kyrgyzstan. All of these countries have a different approach to matters than the Western approach, and the sooner we begin to understand that, the better off we're going to be.

Ambassador, there were two other questions, and I'll just read them, because I do ask our participants that come to hear these hearings to do this little bit.  But you don't have to respond to them right now.  Maybe you can give me something and I'll put it on our Web site. It said could you elaborate or comment on recent Kazakhstan's joining the U.N. conventions protocols on human rights and/or convention against torture.  Kazakhstan has signed it in September '07.

And then the other one I think we've answered.  If the prospect of OSCE chairmanship has not induced Kazakhstan to make progress so far, why would actual chairmanship induce it to do so?  I think we have had some discussion on that. We have two or three more minutes, and I'll let the ambassador have the last word.

But if I may, I would like to announce for those present that we will hold a hearing of the Helsinki Commission on Thursday, this coming Thursday, October 18th, at 9:30 in Room B-318 of the Rayburn House Office Building. And the hearing is going to focus on the challenges facing today's Europe and the ability of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to meet those challenges, which include unresolved conflicts and obstacles to democratic development in a region stretching across North America and Europe into the Caucuses and Central Asia.

And our witness at that hearing will be the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and chairman of the committee on foreign affairs and the Swedish parliament there, Riksdag, my successor in the organization, Goran Lennmarker -- is going to be our witness, and I encourage people to attend that hearing.

I would also make mention of the fact that the Parliamentary Assembly's annual meeting is in Astana in July of next year and it poses some interesting developments between now and that time.

Ambassador, perhaps, sir -- you've been very gracious with your time, and as Senator Cardin said, and Representative Smith, we deeply appreciate your participation. I hope it has been enlightening for you in the sense that, as I said earlier, a robust dialogue is in progress. You, sir.

IDRISSOV: 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.  It is our policy -- we believe that dialogue is always enlightening.  Therefore, we like being engaged in a dialogue. I would like to make my final statements.  I may once again put on record that we respectfully disagree with those who want to create a picture that there are no building blocks in Kazakhstan for further growth. The situation in early '90s was when Kazakhstan just came out of the shackles of the Soviet Union and there was nothing on the ground there.  We have concentrated our efforts to build the economic building blocks, to grow the country further. This is what we have achieved now, and this is what we are now announcing, that we are now focusing our efforts on political maturing of the society and our institutions.              I do not agree when somebody said that there is no progress.  There is a lot of progress, and this is being widely recognized by many external observers of Kazakhstan.

And I may also make a final point, Mr. Chairman.  We believe that the bid for Kazakhstan, which we announced in 2003 -- when we started to feel our economic muscles to grow, we believe that our bid has created a lot of opportunities. We believe that this is an opportunity for ourselves.  This is an opportunity for our part of the world.  And this is the opportunity for the organization. We all grow.  Therefore, we want that this situation becomes an opportunity -- a situation when we use this opportunity.  And we, of course, do not want to see the situation when it is a missed opportunity.

We invite everyone to look deeply into what's going on, and we believe that we should take the opportunity which is being offered by life to us. We call on all our partners, particularly the United States, which is a strong and longtime partner of independent Kazakhstan, to look at as the golden opportunity to grow for everyone involved in this process. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon the hearing ended at 11:58 a.m.]

END